Carbon capture and storage, to capture CO 2 from power plants and big industry, remains much publicised, much talked about as an essential action against climate change, and intensively analysed and costed. However only two governments have had the courage to provide commercial funding to enable the first integrated projects to occur. The UK has experimented with several proposed funding mechanisms, and with several proposed designs for full-scale projects. However perceived expense remains a persistent blockage from the government perspective. And from the company perspective, perceived risk remains the critical disincentive. The UK has abundant storage which is ready to develop. CCS on gas (or maybe coal) fuelled plant is seen as the ideal compliment to variable wind power, and so is critical to the UK's future electricity delivery planning. What many analysts miss is that CO 2 storage will also be vital to any negative emissions strategy -either co-firing with biomass, or direct capture form the air -both need to bury CO 2 . How will CO 2 storage be validated for commercial use? And how will commercial markets innovate and fund the integrated and expensive projects if UK Government refuses to take on risk?
THE CLIMATE SITUATION AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
Practically all recent news about climate alteration remains bad. Arctic ice continues to retreat in summer months, so much so that the fabled North West passage is now becoming a recognized route for shipping. Record post-glacial temperatures have occurred during the past 10 years. And global CO 2 emissions from human activities continue to increase at higher rates than envisaged in many of the IPCC's scenarios of 2000. Anomalous weather patterns can be statistically recognized in rainfall distribution, and in flooding frequency on-land. Yet the political and public relations battles in support of acting on anthropogenic climate change appear to be lost, at least temporarily. In spite of validation for the basic data on global temperature increase by the 2011 Berkeley group project, and in spite of spirited and accurate legal defence of the University of East Anglia e-mail incident ('UEA-gate') which preceded the UNFCCC CoP-15 Copenhagen, the climate sceptics, deniers, and straightforward climate lethargists remain dominant. The UK public may be as well informed as any in the developed world, yet significant action to curb climate change remains below the top 10 priorities of voters, particularly if that means increasing electricity charges or impacting significantly on personal budgets. This is important for CCS protagonists to recognize. A conventional, and easy, justification for development and installation of CCS on power plant and industry is that it provides a vital mitigation against climate change. It seems that the public may acknowledge this intellectually, yet be unconcerned practically. Placing much greater effort into communication of climate change, and it's associated problem of rapid ocean acidification, may produce converts. But because the effects are slow, multiyear, and multigenerational, this is a problem which will remain less important than mortgages, jobs, food prices, heating, and holidays. It is sometimes claimed that "all that is needed" is a major disaster. Yet well-publicised global disasters such as Paris heatwave deaths, New Orleans flooding, Fukushima (tsunami and radioactivity), or Russian wildfire have achieved minimal traction within the UK, perhaps because they are distant, and precisely because they are so unusual or exotic.
It is surprising, then, that public support for CCS in the UK is so positive. At present, this can only be because of the minimal invasion and minimal impact presented by planned and costed projects. That strongly suggests that a good tactical option with CCS is not to engage in wide-scale public advertisement, but to focus information on those who could be most directly affected locally.
STATUS OF TECHNOLOGIES
CCS continues to suffer from a persistent schizophrenia, manifested by obsession with the cost and difficulty of capture at centralized locations, whilst flipping to the uncertainty, worry, and expressed ignorance about the risks and difficulty of storage. It is naïve, but still true, to give attention to both statements. The engineering of capture appears more and more likely to follow a standard path of technology evolution by construction, learning, improvement, and reconstruction -although there are plenty of warning signs from nuclear plant in France and the USA that greater operational complexity (two-shift operation, complex load-following) can produce increased plant costs through time, not reductions of cost. As for storage, the human induced rules for integrity of CO 2 containment performance are an almost impossible obstacle in Europe, making the interim position to maintain 100% CO 2 leakage to atmosphere, whilst nuclear waste disposal enjoys more lax permissions to leak through time.
Even so, the designs, and re-designs of the power plant capture operations have converged onto stable consensus solutions. All that remains is to build and operate new plant in order to commence on the learning pathway with anticipated cost reduction. The critical question is, should the UK obtain that learning by means of fullscale industrial projects, or should that learning incrementally be acquired by a succession of 10 times, to 2 times, smaller pilots? These can progressively prove the component efficiency and reduce parasitic costs throughout the combustion, capture, compression, and transportation system. Cheaper plants mean a greater number of building cycles, normally with faster learning rates. Capture commercialization is ready to start and, depending upon optimism of the technology pathway analogue chosen, will reduce costs within 10 years, or within 30 years. However the UK ambition remains to build full-scale CCS plant, and accelerate learning rates beyond any historical precedents, to full economic deployment from 2020. A cold-hearted assessment would suggest that low-cost, commercially competitive, CCS will be slower than anticipated to arrive.
AMBITION AND RATE OF BUILD
To overcome the blatant issues of cost of capture, parasitic energy penalty, efficiency loss, and expense; a standard approach is to anticipate and invent improvements to the design to be implemented in each successive CCS power plant. Thus the technological learning occurs, and cost reduction is usually anticipated to progress down a learning curve. In many technologies it is clearly established that speed of progression along the learning curve, together with cost reduction and efficiency recovery, is related to the number of units constructed. Here there is an obvious problem in that CCS has multiple variants, and that cost of a single plant is extremely large. Therefore slower learning can be anticipated because learning from one type of capture may be only peripherally relevant to reduce costs in a second type of capture. Additionally, even with good political results, the present lack of policy and financial imperatives, suggests that only a few tens of commercial scale CCS plant will be built and operating by 2020. Learning will be slow because of small numbers of units, and learning will be dispersed amongst three capture technology strands.
To achieve greater engagement with global industries, and also to enable national supply chains of components to develop, both require a visible program of work to be outlined at a rate which fits with industrial ability to deliver. There is no point in building three plants fitted with CCS between 2014 to 2018, only then to halt construction until the results are available in 2022. Supply chains to drive down costs will not develop, and small numbers of such one-off projects will not attract the equipping of production lines by engineering majors, or the attention of SME product providers to produce low-cost modular components suitable for a fleet build of power plant. Sustained rates of build are needed, even if slow, rather than boom and bust cycles. Arguably CCS construction will be a global effort, with components supplied by a small number of successful OEM global vendors. Costs will be driven down, by sharing between Governments hosting and managing pilot projects, and the global vendors building them. Even if this occurs, there is no guarantee of manufacture locally within a nation. So the UK can import entire capture plants, but that still precludes creating a local and domestic industry supply chain to be ready by 2014.
There is a huge disparity between the requests and demands from manufacturing industry interested in CCS development, and the cautious level of ambition expressed by UK government. The motives of the two are entirely different, the industry motive being to create long-term order books, which will justify equipping of factories and recruitment and training of workforces. The UK government motive being that CCS has no automatic right to exist, and must justify its place amongst rival carbon reduction technologies for electricity on a cost competitive basis. There are no special favours on offer at present for CCS if it remains significantly more expensive than offshore wind -although some additional cost is justified because CCS electricity could be argued to have a greater business value if it can be dispatched when required.
An illustration of the variable ambitions is shown in Figure 1 . This plots the different rates of ambition for UK CCS power plant construction. To achieve the almost-complete decarbonisation of electricity in the UK by 2030, as projected by advice from the Committee on Climate Change, requires some 30 GW of installed CCS capacity. If coal is to be retained within the UK fuel mix, that requires a programme of construction, with a target of 5 GW of CCS capacity on coal plant installed by 2020. That is hard, and now looks to be impossible at this time of writing in 2012. If the historically large contribution of coal into the UK electricity generation mix is sacrificed, then the UK can achieve similar amounts of CCS generation capacity, by burning gas. Because gas plant is smaller and cheaper to construct, then such decisions can be deferred until after 2020. By analogy with the historical construction rates during the UK "dash for gas" of the 1990's, then commercial order books of CCS projects can still be developed, and smaller and cheaper plants can be built at a more rapid rate. Figure 1 . UK build rates of CCS under different scenario assumptions. "Dash for Coal" (crosses) are a long term slow build rate starting in 2010, including coal plant for fuel diversity, to meet Committee on Climate Change targets of substantially decarbonised electricity by 2030. Build rate is projected at half the UK "dash for gas" of the 1990's. That averaged at 2.4 GW / yr. "Secure coal" (triangles) delays building coal and gas CCS, and then needs to compensate by construction of mixed coal and gas. "Defer gas" (squares) pathway is to rely entirely on gas fossil fuel, with a build rate comparable to the dash for gas. "DECC coal" (diamonds) is an optimistic interpretation of current UK Government DECC planning. This will clearly miss climate change targets and UK legal stipulations by a substantial margin from 2025 onwards.
Neither of the above projections coincide with recent or current UK government statements, which suggests that a very conservative rate of build will be satisfactory enough for energy mandarins and especially the Treasury. That will clearly not approach close to the target from the Committee on Climate Change, and will certainly not produce a large order book of CCS projects sufficient to encourage creation of manufacturing capability and job creation within the UK.
TRANSPORT
Transportation in pipelines onshore to offshore has achieved resilient designs, with accepted and recognizable solutions. The practical construction of CO 2 pipeline is planned and routed from desk-based information -although this has yet to be proven, in practical UK construction activity. The deep and wide experience of network pipeline operators in the UK and elsewhere, for methane, water, or CO 2 , suggests that fundamental land-based barriers and surprises are not expected. What is needed, of course, is careful engagement with the publics who will be neighbours and potentially affected by the construction and existence of such pipe networks. These are important recipients of CCS education, to enable individual judgements to be made -hopefully to accept CO 2 pipes positively.
STORAGE
There can, of course, be no complete CCS chain without storage. Storage can not be moved. It is located where nature has endowed the subsurface assets, and no amount of redesign can create storage from nothing. The UK is uniquely well provided with CO 2 storage potential, because of the geological coincidence of widespread and thick regional reservoir sandstone formations offshore. These are associated with well understood and exploited hydrocarbon deposits beneath the whole North Sea. This is potentially a unique and singular asset for the UK. Yet exploitation of storage remains at a preliminary stage. Several groups, from the British Geological Survey (BGS) and Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage (SCCS) and Tyndall Centre, have made regional high-level assessments, and the Energy Technologies Institute have confirmed similar results by means of a more detailed data rich suite of calculations. It is clear that the UK has the potential to store hundreds of years from its own emissions. In addition the UK can offer to store the CO 2 arising from power plants and industry in much of industrialised north west Europe. The barriers here are finding developers of the subsurface willing to pay attention to such low profit operations, which could have such adverse liability outcomes [due to exceptionally stringent requirements under the EU's CCS Directive]. And there are barriers in identifying by whom, or how, the detailed investigations of specific storage sites, to the required European standards, will be funded and operated.
PROVING STORAGE
A simple example illustrates the problem. Ancient river deposits of 250-240Ma created the Bunter sandstone, which occurs onshore in eastern England and slopes down to pass beneath the entire southern North Sea, to occur again in the Netherlands and northern Germany. This is a thick sandstone, which contains many commercial gas fields in the Netherlands and Germany, so it is an ideal candidate for CO 2 storage. Offshore of the southeast UK are some 20 to 30 large fault structures, underground topographic hills, which could act as ideal receptacles for CO 2 , piped for short distances from power station clusters in eastern England. Yet the size of the storage resource remains a major unknown. Basic calculations of maximum storage volume, based on pore space available, suggest capacities could be 14 G tonnes CO 2 . By contrast, site-specific screening of each potential structure using commercial risk and quality filters reveals geological flaws or uncertainty in many of these, such that only 2 G tonnes may be viable. Even this smaller capacity remains unproven, due to a lack of information on the fluid connectivity between structures, and information on the ability to accommodate pressure increases during CO 2 injection within the whole subsurface reservoir system, and avoid damaging the integrity of overlying seal rocks. At present, the commercially validated storage in this resource is nil.
To make such storage available requires an exploration approach, which will inevitably involve drilling boreholes specifically to inject fluid and monitor the effects. A programme of such work must precede power plant development and final investment decision by several years (Fig 2) . By analogy with hydrocarbon appraisal a sufficient knowledge of such structures could easily require five holes, each of which may cost £30-£50 million. It remains unclear which organisations will invest in these front-end costs. Ideally, this is well within the expertise and financial remit of transnational hydrocarbon companies. However the prize at the end of such exploration remains uncompetitive with investment opportunities for hydrocarbon companies in rival projects worldwide, which could generate substantial revenue from standard hydrocarbon exploration and production. Either UK government needs to subsidise such exploration, or a utility with appetite for risk needs to be engaged; or the profit from disposing of CO 2 needs to be greatly increased, and the risk downside greatly decreased, to attract oil companies.
It should be noted, of course, that there are many types of storage offshore, some of which can be much more easily developed than the Bunter Sandstone. The most data rich and most certain of these are inevitably depleted gas fields. These will be more than sufficient to allow start-up of the initial UK projects which will attempt the commercialization route. However this single type of storage answer also begs the question of how such projects should be used. In previous determinations of UK CCS projects, with rigid rules, it has been specified that one storage destination should be developed and operated throughout the 15 year life of a project. This appears to be a waste of good, rare, CO 2 . Much more sensible would be to utilize a secure and commercially viable storage site for the initial few years of the project. But once it is proven that performance during injection matches predictions made before injection, after, say, three years then storage should be developed in a second underground situation to test that and validate predictions of its integrity for 3 to 5 years, then move on to a third -and so on. If any of the subsequent storage sites fail to perform adequately, then storage injection can revert to the initial secure site, to mitigate any risk of venting expensively captured CO 2 . The basic point here is that demonstration and commercialization is certainly not restricted to capture and power plant engineering, but needs to be deliberately directed towards validating a wide spectrum of subsurface storage, which will be required for routine roll-out of CCS during the 2020s. Figure 2 . Projected cost comparisions, for illustration only, showing that the conventional consideration of powerplant costs to built and operate (mid-grey curve and dashed line) are incurred shortly before profitable operation starts. These are balanced by low-risk income from electricity sales in a utility business. By contrast, the exploration costs to investigate storage, in just part of one saline formation suitable to accept CO2 from this powerplant and capture project, are committed several years in advance of any income (dark grey graph). Those sunk costs do not inevitably guarantee successful storage, so are a risk. In a good case, if viable storage is confirmed, there will be additional development borehole costs near the commencement of storage (pale grey). Additional costs will occur during the project lifetime for remediation and control of the injected CO2, as well as borehole sealing work at the end of injection life and at least one monitoring survey after site closure (pale grey). This compilation ignores the pipeline construction and transport costs. Subsurface expenditure could approach that of the surface powerplant and capture equipment.
STORAGE FOR NEGATIVE EMISSION TECHNOLOGIES
A discussion of carbon capture and storage is currently dominated by perceived applications to CO 2 capture from coal and gas fuelled power plant, with occasional references to CO 2 capture from large centralized industries. However, it is increasingly clear that CCS in this form will be much slower to develop than anticipated by its protagonists and advocates. Viewed as a standard technology evolution of a major energy system innovation, it would be entirely normal for such developments to take 10 or 30 years to reach pervasive development and deployment. Consequently those timescales of global emission reductions do not match with the much shorter timescales, and much greater total emission reductions, required from climate modeling. In the World Energy Outlook 2011, the International Energy Agency makes the unwelcome, but realistic, calculation that by 2017 all the carbon combustion equipment necessary to surpass the 450 ppm atmospheric target will be constructed, will be operational, and will be locked in. It is inevitable, therefore, that attention will eventually refocus on withdrawal of CO 2 from the atmosphere stock, or attention will be directed to more dramatic global and regional engineering interventions. Many of these require some type of extraction of CO 2 from the atmospheric stock.
One example of intervention may be co-combustion of biomass with fossil fuel. Biomass may be one of the most scarce resources of the energy future. If this valuable biomass is co-combusted with coal or gas at greater than 10% energy equivalent at a power plant, and carbon capture at 95% or better is fitted, then there is the possibility to obtain a systematic but slow reduction of atmospheric CO 2 . This requires managing the biomass stock which captures atmospheric CO 2 . High-level calculations estimate that this could be sustainable with local biomass for a country the size of Scotland with a 5 million population. Similar calculations could apply in Scandinavian nations, or North American states with existing sustainable forestry supply chains. However it is equally clear that for the UK as a whole, with over 62 million population, the onshore carrying capacity cannot provide sufficient biomass to close that CO 2 cycle. Even so, systematic use of biomass can produce a net benefit. To grasp this benefit requires the CO 2 to be stored. The only available global proposition for large scale storage remains injection into geological reservoirs deep below ground, just as with power plant CCS. So secure storage of CO 2 , achievable in commercial conditions, is still essential.
A second example may be direct capture of CO 2 from air. There are several propositions available, ranging from adjunct engineered additions onto a conventional power plant utilizing low-grade heat, to innovative new ventures coupled to arrays of carbon fuel cells, to renewable-powered designs of artificial trees or mega-cooling towers located in suitable climatic regions. Again, capture technology is an essential first step, and by no means yet proven, but the ultimate utility of these interventions will still require concentration of CO 2 , collection, transport, and secure long-term disposal into geological formations deep below ground. Without large-scale, commercially available, CO 2 storage then air capture remains elusive. The only plausible method of circumventing this requirement is to use mineral capture of CO 2 which, for the tonnages involved, will create an onshore mineral extraction and transportation industry comparable to that of coal at present. So, for a third reason, deep geological storage of CO 2 appears to be desirable.
RISK
Although Grangemouth oil refinery had been assessed for CO 2 capture and supply in the late 1990's, the first CCS power plant in the UK was not commercially proposed until 2005, at Peterhead by BP. That was timed to precede the Gleneagles meeting of the G8, which specifically stated global support for CCS development. That offer of CCS appeared to take the UK government by surprise, and no clear answer was provided to BP. Instead, the UK government chose to create a procurement competition, which was announced during late 2007. The type of procurement selected was similar to that used for large government purchases of known items, such as military hardware, where cost control and restricted research are priorities. The specifications of the competition, the design requirements for the power plant and CCS operation, and the financial restrictions were all extremely tightly written, with little room for innovation or development. At higher levels of government, especially in the Treasury, it must have been well known at the time that these types of specification are extremely hard to meet. Is it possible, then, that a deliberately difficult hurdle for CCS power plant to surpass was set, in full knowledge that such a project would almost inevitably fail? At that time, there was also a strong and active discussion to form the direction for construction of new nuclear power plant within the UK, considered by many in government as a proven, secure, and low-cost method of delivering low carbon electricity. The true rationale behind these decisions may never be fully known.
During 2007 to 2011, the UK government operated a CCS competition, in which commercial bidders were invited to design and propose projects suitable to receive a government award of £1 billion for capital funding, plus additional financial support totalling close to a further £1 billion for operational costs during a 15 year operational lifetime. That competition initially attracted many expressions of interest, with some nine serious bids received at the outset. Perhaps somewhat shocked by the seriousness and number of industrial interested parties, the UK government then decided to clarify the aims of this competition, and made clear technology choices to restrict entrants to plants related to coal combustion and, within that, only post-combustion capture systems. That reduced the number of competition entrants to 4. These entrants rapidly decreased in number, as the limits to UK funding became clear, and as experienced multinational companies made their own calculations of costs. Those calculations illuminated a problem that the UK ambition was large, to design build and operate an unprecedented CCS post-combustion operation on a 400 MW coal fuelled power plant, but UK funding support was small, and restrictions on innovation and flexibility were severe. BP and Scottish and Southern Electricity withdrew their Peterhead project and attempted to remain in the Competition, along with utilities such as RWE, E.On and ScottishPower. The final BP withdrawal from any CCS project in the UK, was timed for the day of budget announcements on CCS support level and rate of progress. In a similar way E.ON chose to withdraw their Kingsnorth project on the day of the Comprehensive Spending Review announcements. Those timings suggest that these companies had already made their analyses, and were seeking high profile exits to pointedly make their case on the inadequate match between UK ambition and finance. Those warnings were ignored.
Eventually only ScottishPower remained, with the Longannet project in central Scotland. In many ways, this appeared to provide an ideal candidate for the UK programme: a retrofit on Europe's third largest coal fuelled power plant, which could link into existing pipeline infrastructure, and could reuse an existing depleted gas field. That would extend the life of an established coal fuelled generator, and provide a worthy template to develop retrofit solutions saleable to the rest of the world. However, that was not to be. An outline engineering design was provided to the UK government in 2009, and priced the project at £1.2 billion with an error of plus or minus 25%. During 2010 a full and detailed FEED (front end engineering design) was made, and this concluded with a central price of £1.3 billion with a much smaller error of -12% to +15%. That in itself is entirely unsurprising, although the greatly reduced error margins are a very positive testament to an extremely thorough engineering study. The engineering design study did show, without doubt, that post combustion CO 2 capture equipment could be fitted to a coal plant, and could operate, and could transport CO 2 on land for 150 km, to be pipelined offshore and injected for safe and secure storage. It is clear that power plant CCS is viable in a technical and engineering sense.
Many factors were also in play, including, firstly the purchase and takeover of ScottishPower by the global Iberdrola group, which was much less committed to coal generation, and more strategically focused on renewable wind, hydro-power and low carbon gas combustion. Secondly the UK Labour government had evolved all-party support to fund CCS by means of a small levy on wholesale electricity prices, which would be hypothecated directly to development of pilot projects. Following the 2010 election, this levy was scrapped by the new Conservative-Liberal coalition government, and its stated replacement was intended to be the electricity market reform, which would provide a premium, high, price to encourage development of low carbon electricity sources. Unfortunately, no detailed information on this new market was available, so no business decision could be made. A high premium electricity price "carrot" would be also matched by a "stick" of a carbon floor price tax on the power industry, which would increase the EU allowance price within UK to £16 per tonne CO 2 from 2013, rising to £70 per tonne CO 2 by 2030. The outcome was that operators were faced with the certainty of increasing operational costs, which would make their remaining unabated 75% of the Longannet plant uneconomic, mitigated by the promise of a premium electricity price which remained entirely invisible. It was no surprise, then, that a commercial electricity provider was unable to accept those unrealistic commercial terms provided by UK government. The project failed.
A second group of factors within this UK competition were also vitally important, those relating to costs of risk. The costs of the Longannet project were larger than expected by the Government. Generic analyses for costs of CCS had been made beforehand, by experienced external engineering consultants such as PB Power, Mott MacDonald, or Redpoint. The final costs of Longannet, when they were submitted, lay significantly above all these. Why should this be?
Because of the restrictive terms and conditions of the procurement rules within the UK competition, any overrun of costs, and liability for excess would clearly lie with the power supply company as lead developer. Power companies do not take large risks. Favoured investments by those utilities are large networks of infrastructure, such as transmission cables, or items of proven and reliable equipment, such as power stations. These can be run reliably and at known cost for 20 years, 40 years, or longer with an annual rate of return typically at 5 to 10%. Venturing into construction of a pre-first of a kind engineering project with a financial value at 10 to 20% of the company's total value, is not a normal endeavor. In such cases, normal practice is to price the risk of failure or of underperformance. That means adding a risk premium to the basic predicted price of engineering and delivery. Because UK government refused to take any sharing of cost overrun, and because the bidding consortium was constructed of an informal alliance, without a formal binding agreement, of ScottishPower, National Grid, and Shell UK, all financial risk could eventually fall to be met by ScottishPower. A prudent, and risk averse, management would therefore price in additional buffers against risk at every opportunity.
It is not known publicly how cost estimates were derived and displayed in detail. However a simple experimental calculation illustrates clearly that pricing risk multiple times throughout a project can result in very substantial cost inflation. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . Conceptually a component is built; it is possible that this component may fail within the CCS project, so a risk premium of 15% is added. Several components are combined into an assembly; it is possible that this assembly may underperform within the CCS project, so a risk premium of 15% is added. Several assemblies combine into a power plant, and that power plant is connected to different organisations developing and operating the pipeline, and then developing and operating the storage. It is possible that this chain, interconnected in real-time 365 days per year throughout the 15 years of project, may underperform; so a risk premium of 15% is added. It is clear that the net result is for the final cost of the project to be inflated by some 80%. This is one explanation why the Longannet project became priced at a greater than anticipated total. But the more important illustration, for generic innovation of CCS, is that restrictive contracts will produce defensive pricing. There are multiple ways in which this can be addressed, but fundamentally the UK government must either provide a greater profit for the whole CCS operation, or the UK government must share the risk and agree to become liable for a large part of any overrun costs. That type of approach does not sit comfortably within a UK free market philosophy, and at present remains unresolved.
Although it is easy to target Governments for blame games, then the CCS situation is even more complex again, so UK Government certainly do not carry all the burden of failure. Two quick examples will illustrate this. Firstly, if Government agrees to underwrite money for all aspects of a project -like a Private Finance Initiative, even if that is operated by private industry, then costs can increase greatly. There are persistent allegations that large UK PFI projects have total costs to taxpayers up to 3 times the expected amount. So there is no easy way for Government to disengage from active management. Secondly, the optimistic ambition was for a EU Emissions Trading Scheme to price CO2 emissions permits, and so make the price of CO2 emission very high. In the event, that market mechanism has worked only at a very low level, the price of CO2 is too low by a factor of 5, variable, and hence not bankable. Federal Europe has failed in its most fundamental financial support. And of course many large utility companies benefited from huge windfall profits by being able to sell their un-used emissions permits. Those profits did not appear to be reinvested into CCS -but were spent elsewhere within the trans-national organisations. Figure 3 . Illustration of cost inflation, when 15% risk premium is added to each stage of the powerplant plus capture design. This moves from Components, to Units comprising multiple components, to power Plant comprising multiple units, with a final premium added to the whole Project. The un-risked cost is £1Bn, the riskprotected cost is £1.8Bn. There can be a role for Governments to underwrite early projects and reduce costs, but active management or smart contracts are clearly needed.
If the problems of risk allocation, risk sharing, and commercial pricing continue to be unresolved, then it is clear that projects which are perfectly viable in engineering terms, such as the BP 2005 Peterhead project, the E.ON Kingsnorth project, or the ScottishPower Longannet project, will always fail at the final investment decision because a power company cannot afford to take those expensive financial risks.
OPTIMISM OF REAL CCS DEVELOPMENTS
There are still many positive developments for CCS globally, although at a slower rate and in a less connected fashion than ideally planned. During 2011 the Boundary Dam post-combustion coal project in Saskatchewan was funded for construction. During 2012 it is likely that three commercial scale CCS projects will be consented and start construction -these are at Maasvlakte ROAD project in the Netherlands, with postcombustion on a new build coal plant and CO 2 being pipelined offshore for storage in a depleted gas field. This does not rely on European New Entrant Reserve (NER) funding. Secondly, the Texas Clean Energy Project at Odessa Texas, where a newbuild IGCC will undertake pre-combustion capture with the CO 2 being sold for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects. A high value strand of urea production will finance the plant together with generous Federal and State grants and tax write downs. Thirdly, the Tenaska Trailblazer at Sweetwater Texas, where post-combustion capture will be fitted to a new coal plant, and CO 2 supplied for EOR. The lessons are cleargovernment has to provide substantial capital funding, there needs to be a reliable revenue though the project, secure storage is needed, and minimal awards from Federal Governments through competition. The UK has clearly lost the race to be "first" with CCS, but is still in the running to be "amongst the first", and is the only nation to restructure its electricity market in a way which may be able to support CCS development and operation to become normal practice. Ultimately though, decisions will depend on the interactions of price, reliability, and risk. All of that still needs to be underpinned by political will to keep pushing on decarbonising the all-energy supply system.
CONCLUSIONS
1) CCS is proceeding much slower in the UK and internationally, than its proponents anticipated 2) Climate change is proceeding as fast, if not faster, than its analysts and modellers anticipated. Targets for atmospheric content of CO 2 will be broken by substantial margins. Can CCS provide any remedy? 3) Power plant capture of CO 2 has not been demonstrated at full scale, and is expensive with a large energy penalty. Because of multiple types of CO 2 capture within CCS and a slow rate of build, it may take many years to progress down anticipated cost reduction curves. 4) Storage has barely started to be developed, and could become a rate-limiting blockage. Hundreds of millions of pounds are likely to be needed to develop storage aquifers capable of hosting tens and hundreds of million tonnes of CO 2 capacity. 5) Storage of CO 2 will be needed for Negative Emission Technologies, so should be developed irrespective of power plant CCS. 6) The UK CCS 'first demonstration' project was too-tightly specified, with insufficient speed, or sharing of risk by Government. Consequently the project was priced high, and failed. 7) Detailed engineering in several projects shows clearly that CCS is technically feasible. Globally, one commercial powerplant project is approved for commercial development, and three more are anticipated to start commercial development during 2012. These all have generous government grants, minimal competition hurdles, and strong revenue contracts.
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